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Supplemental Brief of Respondent 
As a supplemental brief the respondent herewith 
submits the following additional argument in support 
of the judgment of the lower court and POINT IV of 
its original brief. 
ADDITIONAL ARGUMENT 
POINT IV 
SECTION 32-2-1 OF THE REVISED 
ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY, 
1 
UTAH, 1965, IS A VALID EXERCISE 
OF THE POLICE POWER. 
Section 32-2-1 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt 
Lake City, Utah, 1965, provides as follows: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person to: 
" ( 1) Commit or off er or agree to commit a 
lewd act or an act of sexual intercourse for hire 
or of moral perversion. -
"* * * 
" ( 7) Direct or off er to direct any person to 
any place or building for the purpose of commit-
ting any lewd act or act of sexual intercourse 
for hire or of moral perversion. 
"(8) Aid, abet, allow, permit or participate in 
the commission of any of the acts prohibited in 
subsection ( 1) through ( 7) above." 
It is asserted by the appellant that Salt Lake City 
has no authority to pass such an ordinance because such 
acts have not been declared to be unlawful by the State 
legislature and the city has not been specifically author-
ized to prevent such acts. Section 10-8-41, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, authorizes cities as follows: 
"They may suppress or prohibit the keeping 
of disorderly houses, houses of ill fame or assigna-
tion, or houses kept by, maintained for, or re-
sorted to or used by, one or more females for 
lewdness or prostitution within the limits of the 
city and within three miles of the boundaries 
thereof, and may prohibit resorting thereto for 
any of the purposes aforesaid; * * *." 
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And Section 10-8-51, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
grants the following power to cities: 
"They may provide for the punishment of*** 
prostitutes, * * *." 
It is claimed by the appellant that the foregoing statutes 
have application only to prostitution which necessarily 
requires proof of indiscriminate sexual intercourse with 
a plurality of men as opposed to one man. Assuming 
this argument to be true, it still does not follow that the 
city has no authority to enact the above cited ordinance. 
Section 10-8-84, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, grants 
the following broad police power to cities: 
"They may pass all ordinances and rules, and 
make all regulations, not repugnant to law, nec-
essary for carrying into effect or discharging all 
powers and duties conferred by this chapter, and 
such as are necessary and proper to provide for 
the safety and preserve the health, and promote 
the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and 
good order, comfort and convenience of the city 
and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protec-
tion of property therein; and may enforce obedi-
ence to such ordinances with such fines or penal-
ties as they may deem proper, provided that the 
punishment of any offense shall be by fine in any 
sum less than $300 or by imprisonment not to 
exceed six months, or by both such fine and 
imprisonment." (Emphasis added) 
\Vith respect to the exercise of the police powers as set 
forth in the above statute, it is stated as follows in 16 
Am .. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 309: 
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"A cardinal principal involved in the exercise 
of the police power establishes the well settled 
rule that the police power may be exerted to pre-
serve and protect the public morals. Therefore, 
any practice or business the tendency of which, 
as shown by experience, is to weaken or corrupt 
the morals of those who follow it or to encourage 
idleness instead of habits of industry is a legiti-
mate subject for regulation or prohibition by the 
state." 
Andin 37 Am. Jur., Municipal Corporations,§ 288, 
it is stated: 
"Municipalities may exercise police power for 
preservation and protection of the public morals." 
In accordance with the foregoing well established 
principles, and pursuant to the power contained in Sec-
tion 10-8-84, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the Utah 
Supreme Court, in Ogden City v. Leo, 54 U. 556, 182 
P. 530, 5 A.L.R. 960, upheld as reasonable and valid a 
city ordinance prohibiting the maintenance of booths of 
certain dimensions in restaurants so as to prevent per-
sons of both sexes having no regard for law or good 
morals from meeting in such places. And in Gronlund 
v. Salt Lake City, 113 U. 284, 194 P.2d 464, this court 
held that the powers granted under Section 10-8-84, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, are sufficiently compre-
hensive to grant authority to cities to pass Sunday 
closing ordinances which are otherwise valid. The same 
has been held true with respect to an ordinance providing 
particular means for collection and disposal of garbage, 
Salt Lake City v. Bernhagen, 56 U. 159, 189 P. 583, and 
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for the inspection and regulation of the sale of milk. 
Salt Lake City v. Howe, 37 U. 170, 106 P. 705, Ann. 
Cas. 1912C, 189. Certainly if the prohibition involved 
in the Leo case had a reasonable relationship to the pres-
ervation of the public morals, the prohibition of an act 
of sexual intercourse for hire under the city ordinance 
in this case would also bear a reasonable relationship to 
the preservation and protection of public morals. The 
appellant admits that prostitution, i.e., indiscriminate 
sexual intercourse with men as opposed to a single man, 
is a proper subject of legislative prohibition. Does the 
second proved act of sexual intercourse for hire make 
the original occurrence any more inimical to the public 
interest than the original occurrence standing alone? We 
think not. Every prostitute must undertake her first 
act of sexual intercourse for hire as a prelude to her 
becoming a "prostitute" within the definition advanced 
by the appellant. It would appear elemental that any 
act which has a tendency to encourage or promote "pros-
titution" in the legal sense is contrary to the public good 
and, therefore, is subject to prohibition by a munic-
ipality in the exercise of its police powers to protect and 
preserve the public morals. It would appear most un-
reasonable to assume that the first act of sexual inter-
course for hire by a woman will not be followed by a 
second, a third and perhaps a lifetime of selling human 
flesh. Common experience and knowledge dictates other-
wise. There is a direct relationship between an act of 
sexual intercourse for hire and indiscriminate sexual 
intercourse with men. 
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The Supreme Court of California has long held 
that a municipality, in the exercise of its police powers, 
may prohibit any practice or business having a tendency 
to weaken or corrupt the morals of those who follow it 
or to encourage idleness instead of habits of industry. 
See Ex Parte Tuttle, 91 Cal. 589, 27 P. 933, wherein 
that court states as follows in upholding an ordinance 
of the City and County of San Francisco prohibiting 
pools and wagers on horse racing except within the 
enclosure of the race track: 
"Any practice or business, the tendency of 
which, as shown by experience, is to weaken or 
corrupt the morals of those who follow it, or to 
encourage idleness instead of habits of industry, 
is a legitimate subject for regulation or prohibi-
tion by the state; and that gambling, in the vari-
ous modes in which it is practiced, is thus de-
moralizing in its tendencies, and therefore an evil 
which the law might rightfully suppress without 
interfering with any of those inherent rights of 
citizenship which it is the object of government 
to protect and secure, is no longer an open ques-
tion. The measures needful or appropriate to be 
taken in the exercise of this police power are 
determined by legislative policy and for this pur-
pose a wide discretion is committed to the law 
making body. vVhether it shall entirely prohibit, 
or only regulate by confining such practices with-
in prescribed limits; whether the law shall apply 
to every kind of gambling or only to those games 
or wagers in which evil effects appear with great-
est prominence - must be determined primarily 
by the legislative department of the state or of 
the municipality authorized to exercise this great 
power, which is conferred for the purpose of 
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securing the public safety and welfare; and un-
less it clearly appears that a statute or ordinance 
ostensibly enacted for this purpose has no real 
or substantial relation to these objects, and that 
the fundamental rights of the citizen are assailed 
under the guise of a police regulation, the action 
of that department is conclusive." 
We know of no fundamental right of any person 
to participate in, or aid or abet the commission of, an act 
of sexual intercourse for hire whether it be for the first 
time or the hundredth time, and the exercise of the police 
power by Salt Lake City in adopting the foregoing 
ordinance is clearly valid and enforceable. 
In addition to the foregoing, as pointed out in 
respondent's original brief, Section 10-8-50, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, grants broad powers to cities to punish 
persons disturbing the peace and good order of the city 
by indecent or disorderly conduct or by lewd or lasci-
vious behavior and to provide for punishment of such 
other petty offenses as the board of commissioners may 
deem proper. Certainly an act or offer of sexual inter-
course for hire, even if technically insufficient to consti-
tute the offense of prostitution, because of failure of 
proof of indiscriminate sexual intercourse with men, 
falls within the category of moral offenses for which 
the above statute expressly authorizes cities to impose 
punishment. That the commission of an act of sexual 
intercourse for hire or the offer to commit such an act 
is contrary to the well established standards of decency 
and good order of Salt Lake City, the State of Utah 
and the United States of America cannot be seriously 
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disputed. That such acts constitute lewd or lascivious 
behavior would likewise appear to admit of little doubt. 
The legislative body of Salt Lake City has so found and 
this court should not interfere in the exercise of the 
respondent's governmental powers to preserve the peace 
and good order of the city for the well-being of its 
inhabitants by making such acts of moral degeneracy 
unlawful, thereby giving l~gal status to the atomic age 
practitioners of the "oldest profession in the world." 
Respect£ ully submitted, 
HOMER HOLMGREN 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
JACK L. CRELLIN 
Assistant Salt Lake City Attorney 
414 City and County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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